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Early attempts to innovate in the rural financial
markets (RFMs) were motivated by the urgent need
to curb the role and operations of the moneylender.
In the 1950s, it was envisaged that the state should
provide a positive institutional alternative to the
moneylender himself, something which will com-
pete with him, remove him from the forefront and
put him in his place' (RBI 1954, emphasis added).
For the next 30 years the state provided massive
doses of credit to the agricultural sector (where the
bulk of the poor are located) on concessional
terms, often negative in real terms, through either
cooperatives or state-run banks. It had limited suc-
cess. Apart from its contribution to rural non-farm
growth in India, specifically targeted agricultural
credit was of doubtful benefit (Binswanger and
Khandker 1992). By and large, the moneylender
stayed where he was, but in 'several guises' (Bell
1993), and the state-subsidised credit hardly ever
reached the poor, generated economic rents and
inefficiencies, and was financially unsustainable.
There is now widespread consensus that problems
in state intervention in RFMs arose as much from
interest-rate ceilings as from distorted incentives
and weak governance structures of the public-sec-
tor financial institutions. The 'new synthesis of the
1990s' (Lipton 1998) recognises that interest rates
should not be so 'distorted' by public action that
they cease to correctly reflect costs and risks of
lending (Chowdhury 1992; Rahman 1992; Aleem
1993). However, lending to the poor is expensive,
and costs can be high, especially for formal lenders,
if the cost of information on the borrower's ability
and willingness to repay is not easily available.
Informational problems may lead to market failure,
and, in the absence of a collateral, the poor may be
unable to borrow at all. Thus, the cost of credit
market failure is likely to be highest for the poor-
est, who are least able to self-insure and self-
finance.
Over the last two decades, Grameen Bank and
other microfinance institutions (MRs)2 have
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devised innovative credit programmes to address
market failure and deliver credit to the poor. MFIs
use peer monitoring and the joint liability structure
to overcome the screening, monitoring and enforce-
ment problems commonly encountered by formal
lending institutions. They deliver small loans to
poor borrowers, often women organised into small
groups, providing more accessible deposit facilities
and with much greater attention to risk manage-
ment. Targeted micro-credit programmes have a
strong antipoverty focus as they aim to increase
incomes and smooth consumption. Enthusiastic
and large-scale support for these innovations from
multilateral and bilateral donors has ensured a
rapid growth of the MFIs across the world3 and they
have now emerged as antipoverty instruments in
many low-income countries' (Khandker).
This IDS Bulletin examines three key themes in cur-
rent research on micro-credit: impact, targeting and
sustainability. Much of the recent debate revolves
around these themes and any future development of
the micro-credit lending technology' will have to
address the issues relating to impact, targeting and
sustainability of the programme.
But before that two clarifications are due. First, the
terms micro-credit, microfinance and micro-enter-
prise credit are used interchangeably in much of the
literature.4 However, micro-credit refers to small
loans, whereas microfinance is appropriate where
NGOs and MFIs supplement the loans with other
financial services (savings, insurance, etc.). On the
other hand, the major limitation of the term 'micro-
enterprise credit' is that it seems to ignore loan fun-
gibility by assuming that all credit reaching a
household corresponds to an equivalent rise in
investment in micro-enterprises.5 Even though the
MFIs discussed may also provide financial services,
the discussion in this volume is focused on ïssues
surrounding provision of credit to small borrowers.
Second, while attempts have been made to maintain
According to World Bank (1996), there are more than
900 active micro-finance programmes in 101 different
countries. Based on a survey conducted in September
1995 which included 206 programmes from 900
institutions, total lending is nearly $7 billion and with
deposit mobilisation of over $19 billion.
Three new terms have recently seeped into the
terminology: 'credit' (which is the equivalent of 'micro-
credit'), credit plus' (which refers to credit plus
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regional neutrality, critical readers may discern a
'Bangladesh-bias' in the selection of papers. To some
degree that is inevitable since 'Bangladesh probably
offers the best-documented and most varied efforts
to reach the poor through financial mechanisms'
(Von Pischke et al. 1997).
1 Measuring Impact
Impact assessments are usually promoted by donors
keen to assess whether support of micro-credit pro-
grammes is 'good value for money'. For this it is
necessary to 'prove impact' on the intended benefi-
ciaries. This is not always easy An immediate ques-
tion is impact on what? Impact may be measured on
income, wealth, food security, child nutrition, qual-
ity of life or gender relations (Copestake 1995).
Johnson argues that the tools of impact assessment
have so far neglected an assessment of effects which
go beyond users, or the institutions which serve
them, to the nature and functioning of financial
markets. This may be because micro-credit pro-
grammes are currently promoted as a strategy for
both poverty alleviation and women's empower-
ment (RESULTS 1997). This section reviews the
impact of these programmes on poverty and on
women's empowerment.
On poverty
The impact of micro-credit programmes on poverty
is notoriously difficult to measure. Targeting credit
to the poor is one of many instruments for poverty
reduction. Broad-based economic growth policies,
food-for-work, and targeted wage employment
schemes are non-credit instruments that also help
reduce poverty Is the marginal impact on poverty
from the supply of micro-credit higher, therefore,
than it would be if some or all resource inputs were
transferred from micro-credit to the best alternative
instrument for poverty reduction? Additionally:
1. Money is fungible and it is difficult to isolate
assistance by the MH on the technology side, e.g.
marketing, to help the enterprise), and 'credit plus plus'
(which is credit linked to social development activities
such as conscientisation and awareness-building
practised by BRAC and Proshika for example) - Greeley
(personal comm.).
Ito (1998) has discussed the conceptual confusion
surrounding the use of the terms 'micro-credit' and
'micro-enterprise credit'.
credit impact. Do participants have more stable
and higher incomes than before? Than non-partic-
ipants? It is possible to compare the income of con-
trol groups of non-participants and participants.
But, as Khandker points out in his paper, it is diffi-
cult to estimate whether the increased income is
due to programme participation, or would have
occurred in any case.
2. The definition of 'poverty', how it might be
measured and who constitute the 'poor' are
fiercely contested issues. Is poverty largely about
increasing incomes and consumption or is it about
a much broader set of needs that encourage well-
being? (Hulme and Mosley 1996). In spite of its
many advantages, it is widely acknowledged that
'income is an inadequate measurement of welfare'
(Greeley 1994). The broader view of well-being
recognises that additional credit to a poor house-
hold may increase its capacity to bear risks and
reduce the cost of insurance. This may then enable
households to invest in new, more risky, but prof-
itable, enterprises and asset portfolios, including
the build-up of human capital through education,
for example (Zeller et al. 1997). Alternatively, con-
sumption smoothing through improved credit
access may increase well-being while having little
impact on a household's mean income (ZelIer et al.
1997; Sinha and Matin).6 Similarly, indirect impacts
on nutritional levels, or on women participants'
bargaining power or empowerment as indicated by
their mobility or increased contraceptive use
(Schuler et al. 1997) all contribute to well-being.
Given their goal of poverty reduction through
income and employment generation, it is surprising
that only a few studies (Hossain 1988; Rashid and
Townsend 1994; Pitt and Khandker 1996;
McKernan 1996) have systematically evaluated the
impact of targeted credit schemes on productivity,
incomes or living standards of borrowers.
Repayment rates, the scale of operation and grow-
ing levels of institutional sustainability have been
used as proxy indicators of the success of the
schemes. A growing body of literature (Sebstad and
Cheri 1996 for example) casts doubt on the reliabil-
ity of these indicators as a measure of impact. While
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improved access to credit frequently reduces short-
term hardship and enhances income, there is little
evidence of an on-going process of accumulation
based on improved productivity and capacity
(Dawson 1997). Khandker emphasises the impor-
tance of panel data to assess whether short-term
impacts can be sustained over time, and to under-
stand how participant behaviour may change with
length of programme participation.
There is also a distributional issue in assessing poverty
impact since it is likely that, because of programme
externalities, benefits to the poor are generated at the
expense of others. That is, do the programmes which
make those who get credit better off, make others
worse off? Clearly, much more nuanced research is
required to address these questions.
On empowerment
It is argued that credit programmes empower
women by strengthening their economic roles,
increasing their ability to contribute to the family
income, helping them establish their identity out-
side of the family, and giving them experience and
self-confidence in the public sphere. For
Bangladesh, Hashemi et aI. (1996) show that partic-
ipation in Grameen Bank and BRAC is positively
associated with a woman's level of empowerment,
defined as a function of her relative physical mobil-
ity, economic security, ability to make various pur-
chases on her own, involvement in major
household decisions, relative freedom from domi-
nation within the family, political and legal aware-
ness, and participation in public protests and
political campaigning. The study concluded that
involvement in credit programmes does empower
rural women. Critics (notably Ackerley 1995;
Montgomery et al. 1996; Goetz and Sengupta 1996)
argue that the patriarchal social structure in most
developing countries precludes women's empower-
ment through provision of credit and, under some
circumstances, may even worsen their situations.
Often, women's incomes are controlled by men. All
the same, lending to women still enhances house-
hold welfare (Pitt and Khandker 1996), and the
issue of impact of targeted credit on women's
empowerment is far from resolved.
That is, if a household is in an average year just above that the household is in poverty falls - and so do
the poverty line, and credit reduces fluctuations while incidence, intensity and severity of poverty
flot affecting mean income, then the percentage of time
The real issue is not so much that many women
hand over their loans to men, but the broader one
of finding new and productive economic roles for
women so that more women can use their loans
themselves (ADB 1997). Unless progress is made on
this front, 'a simple emphasis on disbursing loans to
women is likely to encourage tokenism and the
reinforcement of gender roles' (Hulme and Mosley
1996).
Osmani uses the concept of 'breakdown position' to
assess the impact of minimalist credit on women's
relative well-being within the household. Based on
Senh idea about 'cooperative conflict' and the 'fall-
back position', breakdown position represents the
welfare of individuals in the event of a breakdown
of co-operation. It reflects the strength, or vulnera-
bility, of a person in the bargaining process.7 The
stronger a woman 'breakdown position', the
stronger her bargaining power and hence the better
her welfare outcome. The article argues that the rel-
ative well-being of women depends on their respec-
tive bargaining power, which in turn is a function of
their 'breakdown position', perceived contribution
to the household, and perceived self-interest.
Osmani's results show that women's access to credit
has improved their breakdown position,8 but seems
to have had little or insignificant impact on
women's perceived contribution and perceived self-
interest. Osmani cites two reasons for this partial
improvement in women's well-being:
1. Women's limited ability, arising from a lack of
mobility, skills and economic opportunities, to
independently manage large credit volumes,
leads to increased dependence upon their hus-
bands. This suggests that women's independence
and control over loans decrease as loans get bigger.
Thus, loan size needs to be factored in while assess-
ing impact on womenb empowerment. But small
loans, if specific to women, do less to raise their
'value to men' than do big loans. So maybe
If the breakdown of negotiations would have
disastrous consequences for a person, he/she would be
eager to accommodate the other person's interest in
order to save the negotiation from breaking down. This
would ensure that the other person would gain an
upper hand at his/her expense, when the final outcome
is settled.
Breakdown position is measured by three indicators:
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empowerment is not the right thing to be looking
for: poverty reduction and shifts in womenb rate of
market engagement could be enough.
2. Exposure to income-earning activities in a sin-
gle generation cannot perhaps wipe out cen-
turies of cultural conditioning. This is absolutely
critical in interpreting results of studies that rush to
claim a definite positive impact of credit access on
womenh empowerment. The results need to be
tempered by an understanding that indeed it is too
ambitious to expect centuries of social and cultural
oppression and male domination to be overcome by
a few years of participation in a group activity and
exposure to income-earning opportunities. After all,
the 'Grameen Bank ... lends to some women who
have never before even held money in their hands'
(Von Pischke et al. 1997). Clearly, directing credit to
poor rural women alone may be unable to lead to
empowerment, unless several requirements are met
jointly ('Principle of Joint Requirements' - Lipton
1998). Women need credit. But women's improved
access to credit will have to be accompanied by a
number of additional measures, such as non-formal
education, skill upgradation, and social and politi-
cal consciousness-raising to challenge the patriar-
chal social structure, if credit access is to facilitate
women's empowerment. The playing field is only
now beginning to be levelled, it will take more time
and sustained effort before the scores are also level.
But there is also a methodological issue: how well
can existing methods measure empowerment?
Mayoux is critical of the conventional methodolo-
gies often used to assess the various complexities of
'empowerment', which is a tricky concept: difficult
to define, identify or measure. lt is unlikely that
existing quantitative methods can realistically assess
the impact on empowerment. Hashemi et al. (1996)
have used eight indicators to measure empower-
ment, but it is not evident whether they tally with
women's own perceptions of empowerment.9 For
(i) land owned by the wife in her own name, (ii) the
wife's non-land assets, and (iii) whether the wife thinks
she can support herself if left alone.
This is akin to Jodha's (1988) finding that households
in Rajasthan who became income-poorer during
1963/6-1982/4 regarded themselves as being better off
in terms of their self-defined criteria of the quality of
their lives.
example, women may score well on most or all of
the eight indicators but still not 'feel' empowered.
Further, Hashemis study completely ignores the
life-cycle effect by which older women'° often have
fewer restrictions on mobility, greater economic
security, freedom to make purchases, freedom from
domination within the family, greater contribution
to major household decisions, and greater all-round
awareness. This suggests that women
empowerment would occur in any case and, at least
for older women and female heads of households,
cannot necessarily be attributed to targeted credit
programmes.
At the same time, a review of recent evaluations into
the effectiveness of credit programmes in address-
ing women empowerment produces conflicting
results. According to Kabeer (1998), the conflict
arises because the evaluations are based on differing
models of power in the context of gender relations,
and none of them examine impact from the per-
spectives of poor, rural women themselves.
Mayoux extends these arguments and proposes the
use of a participatory learning approach (PLA) for
integrating women concerns into any assessment
of impact on women's empowerment. PTA begins
by examining women's own priorities and strategies
rather than using an externally-imposed set of indi-
cators. This itself would contribute to empower-
ment. First, programme staff would be given a more
representative and reliable exposure to the priorities
and problems of programme participants. Second,
it would develop networks and a forum for discus-
sion between women themselves on issues relevant
to their interests and integrated into programme
decision making. In spite of some costs, the
approach would be an important contribution to
long-term programme sustainability and wider
institutional development.
2 Targeting
Micro-credit programmes maintain their poverty-
focus by using an exogenous eligibility criterion to
screen out non-poor groups. Usually a land-based
criterion is selected since land ownership is often
correlated with wealth in rural areas. Zaman
'As do female heads of households. See Ravallion and Sen (1994) on scope and limits of
land-based targeting in Bangladesh.
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questions the use of a land-based targeting cnte-
non, especially since it may include the non-poor
(such as teachers, shopkeepers) who are land poor
(the inclusion error), and/or exclude the landed
poor (the exclusion error). All the same, it is widely
agreed" that landlessness is a fair approximation for
poverty ini Bangladesh. Successful targeting is
assumed to be a proxy for the programme's success.
But Besley (1997) contends that inclusion of the
non-poor may be necessary to a limited degree to
prevent them from capturing benefits meant for the
poor. Analysing data from BRAC's Rural
Development Programme, Zaman extends Bes1ey
argument to assert that an inflexible implementa-
tion of the targeting criterion to exclude the non-
poor can be detrimental to the poor. At the same
time, target households may themselves be keen to
include, in their group, one or two non-target group
members for help to ensure on-time loan
repayments.
Given the targeting indicator chosen by the pro-
gramme, why does mis-targeting occur? Is it purely
exogenous or a consequence of MFI policy? Has it
increased over time? Matin answers these ques-
tions by relating the cause of mis-targeting among
Grameen Bank borrowers to rapid increases in loan
size (also called credit deepening) since the intro-
duction of seasonal loans in 1992. These loans can
be held in addition to the general loan and have led
to a sudden jump in the average loan size per bor-
rower. Thus, recent members (those who joined
after 1992) own significantly more land than pre-
1992 members. While they may still be poor or the
'vulnerable non-poor' (Zaman's argument), larger
landownership indicates that these households are
likely to divert a smaller proportion of the MFI loan
to smooth consumption (and repay loans) and use
the bulk of it for investment in economic activities.
Sinha and Matin establish that non-target group
households in Madhupur (Bangladesh) use 33 and
30 per cent of the MFI loan respectively for con-
sumption (and debt-servicing), and investment in
agriculture and business enterprises. The compara-
tive figures for target-group households, on the
other hand, are 63 and 20 per cent.
Matin central argument is that the increase in loan
size creates incentives for the principal stakeholders
(non-target group households, MFIs, and target-
group households) to encourage mis-targeting,
explicitly or implicitly (Table 6 of Matins paper).
Reduced likelihood of default by the non-target
group households (with increasing loan sizes)
seems to be an important incentive for METs to
begin to include the less poor (i.e. those just below
or above the poverty line). Loan delinquency has
emerged as a critical issue, since in spite of the
hype, repayment rates do not hover around 98 per
cent. Though there has been no systematic research,
micro-studies (notably, Matin 1998) and private
conversations reveal a steady increase in default
rates'2 at a time when donors have begun to insist
that MFIs achieve financial sustainability. Under
these circumstances, what can an MN do?
Sustainability is difficult to attain through interest
rates increases since the type of activities funded by
most MFIs limit the return on investments. Overly
high interest rates may also be perceived to increase
project failures, drive out safe projects and attract
risk-taking investors (Yaqub). A better alternative
may be to lend larger amounts (i.e. increase the vol-
ume of money circulation) to borrowers more likely
to invest in productive enterprises in order to get
higher returns and therefore, less likely to default.
Typically, these borrowers will be marginal farmers,
possess some skills and education and have an
existing income source (a shop or an enterprise).
This approach is pragmatic from another perspec-
tive. There is considerable evidence that targeted
credit programmes do not benefit (i.e. reduce
poverty of) the poorest of the poor. For them,
'Other targeted programmes would be required to
address their specific needs' (Hashemi 1997). So
shifting of the target group to the marginal farmer
category (the not-so-poor or the vulnerable non-
poor), may be the only way for the MFIs to achieve
their twin goals of poverty reduction and financial
sustainability Thus, the 'mutually assured mis-tar-
geting' as reported by Matin, could be an early indi-
cator of a silent shift in emphasis of targeted credit
programmes from exclusive antipoverty towards
primarily financial sustainability with a bit of
poverty reduction on the side.
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3 Sustainability
A current central concern is to reconcile how MFIs
can continue to lend, without recourse to subsidised
funds (i.e. be sustainable), to more poor people (i.e.
increase outreach). This concern is largely due to
the high cost of MFI operations and declining sub-
sidised funds (World Bank 1996). But declining
subsidies is not exogenous. It seems to have come
about as a result of:
high repayment rates achieved by poor borrow-
ers in the early years in spite of borrowing at near-
market rates of interest, along with
an inability to convincingly establish that 'a dol-
lar spent on targeted credit has a greater impact on
poverty than a dollar spent on alternative policies'
(van de Walle 1997).
From (i) t would be tempting to argue that since
the poor manage to repay loans borrowed at near-
market rates, there is little reason for them to con-
tinue to receive subsidised public funds. Instead,
subsidies should move to other areas such as basic
health care, primary education, food-for-work and
public employment programmes. But this argument
is fallacious since it is the (often modest) subsidies
to reduce the administrative or transaction costs of
lending, and not the subsidisation of interest rates,
that increase the poor's access to 'market' credit
(Galba 1993; Lipton 1998) for reasons explored by
Stiglitz and Weiss (1981).
And as (ii) indicates, despite claims, there is little
empirical evidence that increasing outreach has
indeed reduced poverty Future impact assessment
studies will have to address this challenge.
Financial sustainability is regarded as a means of
increasing outreach since 'sustainability today is
outreach to the poor tomorrow' (Gonzalez-Vega,
quoted in Von Pischke et aI. 1997). A key finding of
a recent study is that, with very few exceptions,
microfinance programmes that have pursued finan-
cial sustainability have achieved far greater outreach
than programmes that have provided subsidised
credit and relied on continuing donor support to
make up the resulting losses (Christen et al. 1995).
This is confirmed by Seibel and Parhusip who
analyse the performance of Bank Shinta Daya, a
'Various reasons for declining repayment rates have been analysed by von Pischke et al. (forthcoming).
private rural bank in Java (Indonesia). Using a com-
bination of individual and group-lending technolo-
gies, the bank has been able to increase its outreach
(through the latter), while maintaining its prof-
itability (through the former). The authors con-
clude that only financially viable institutions can
sustainably reach the poor in significant numbers.
But it is not clear why they should do so since if
sustainability is desired, and shown to be achieved
by directing loans to the non-poor, this practice will
be encouraged for ever.
McNamara and Morse on the other hand, present
the problems faced by a Nigerian NGO - the
Diocesan Development Services (DDS) - when a
major donor tried to push rapidly for attaining
financial sustainability It almost threatened to
derail the years of good work by the DDS as it tried
to cope with the sudden change in approach by the
donor. This article highlights the various problems
which arise when attainment of financial sustain-
ability becomes the centre-piece of donor strategy.
Credit provision is often only one of the many activ-
ities undertaken by NGOs which are multi-purpose
organisations. An over-emphasis on financial sus-
tainability can threaten other activities (such as agri-
cultural advice, awareness on AIDS, TB and the
handicapped, and input supply) with disastrous
consequences for poverty and welfare.
Conceptually, financial sustainability can be
achieved by increasing either breadth (number of
clients served with different kinds of instruments)
or depth (poverty level of the clients) of outreach.'3
However, this is only partially successful.
First, increasing breadth by increasing membership
can involve high transaction costs for the MFI
because of increased staff time, infrastructure, pro-
cessing and follow-up costs. These costs can further
This categorisation relies on Christen (1997) and
Yaron et al. (1997).
Matin (this volume) reports of more than 30 NGOs
providing credit in his study area in northern
Bangladesh.
' Of these about two-thirds are usually Grameen Bank
members.
Wiig (1997) refers to this process as capital deepening
which arises when additional credit is made available to
current borrowers from existing institutions.
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increase, as in Bangladesh, where there is intense
MFI competition, with a large number of MFIs
chasing a limited number of potential borrowers.'
Thus, there is an upper bound on the breadth of
outreach imposed by search and expansion of client
membership.
Second, the potential for increasing the depth of
outreach is limited. In Bangladesh for example, only
about 50-55 per cent of the target-group house-
holds in a village are MFI members.° This maybe
because the non-members rightly think that their
welfare will grow faster without MFI-membership,
or that their lack of access to land, physical capital,
or skills needed will make it difficult for them to
obtain a return above the rate of MFI interest.
These have important policy implications for the
MET which then has little option but to work
towards attaining sustainability by increasing the
loan portfolio of existing clients." This has been
discussed in the previous section. Put on a treadmill
of continuously increasing loan size, poor borrow-
ers cross-finance their MFI and informal loans.'7 But
this can be unsustainable in the long term1' if
households continuously manage loan repayment
with a limited ability to repay. The latter arises from
the household's resource profile, economic oppor-
tunities within and around the village, or the
macro-economic and policy environment. Each fac-
tor, alone or in combination, can impose limits on
the marginal return to capital (Sinha and Matin).
Moreover, since most loans are used primarily for
non-farm activities, limitations on the expansion of
the non-farm sector sets a limit on the amount of
credit that can be utilized profitably Expansion of
credit alone (i.e. outreach) will not create new
employment opportunities for the poor but may
undermine credit viability
target-group households (in Sinha and Matinl
study) used 35 per cent of the value of the MEl loan
and 45 per cent of the informal loan for debt-servicing.
The figures dropped to 15 and 18 per cent respectively
for non-target group households.
If members borrow cheaply (say, at 20 per cent) from
the MFI to repay expensive (say, at 50 per cent)
informal loans, it does not automatically constitute a
debt trap. However, it may become a trap if the MFIs
have an incentive to overlend.
4 Emerging Challenges
Three sets of issues seem central across targeted
micro-credit programmes that aim to reduce
poverty in developing countries.
Targeting. It is probably meaningful to assess the
various targeting instruments and their relevance to
targeting the poor before addressing the issue: What
percentage of MET members are poor?
Impact. It is likely that MFI intervention may
reach the poor but not benefit them. Thus, it is
important to assess what effect the money is having
on poverty But impact indicators are difficult to
measure. Output indicators, such as outreach, loan
repayment rates or financial viability, are only sec-
ond-best since they assume that a certain output
achieves a certain impact. As the preceding discus-
sion suggests, mis-targeting limits the outreach to
the poor but might help the MFI attain sustainabil-
ity And, high loan repayment rates may tell us very
little about whether borrowers use loans to increase
their incomes. So output indicators cannot be true
measures of the impact on poverty Improving
methods for examining the impact of micro-credit
on poverty is an immediate challenge.
Sustainability. MFIs should aim to work
towards attaining financial viability since attempts
to reduce poverty will prove fragile and non-replic-
able when the METs no longer receive public funds.
However, allocation of public funds for micro-credit
programmes should be judged more on the basis of
economic sustainability of the public investment
than on financial sustainability of the MFI.19
Policymakers must allocate public funds among
competing investments so that social returns are
maximised. A recent report warns against the
siphoning of scarce development assistance funds
away from crucial sectors like agriculture, infra-
structure, health, sanitation and education for rela-
tively untested micro-credit schemes (UN 1998,
emphasis added). Thus, a comparison of welfare
gains from targeted micro-credit programmes with
those achieved from alternative approaches is
urgently required to justify the public outlay
° This point has also been made by Zeller et al. (1997).
8
References
ADB, 1997, Microenterprise Development: Not by Credit
Alone, Asian Development Bank, Manila.
Ackerley, BA., 1995, 'Testing the Tools of
Development: Credit Programmes, Loan Investment
and Womens Empowerment', IDS Bulletin, Vol. 26,
No. 3: 56-68.
Aleem, L, 1993, 'Imperfect information, screening,
and the costs of informal lending: a study of a rural
credit market in Pakistan', in K. Hoff et al. (eds.),
The Economics of Rural Organization: Theory, Practice
and Policy, Oxford University Press for the World
Bank.
Bell, C., 1993, 'Interactions between institutional and
informal credit agencies in rural India', in K. Hoff et
al. (eds.), The Economics of Rural Organization:
Theory, Practice and Policy, Oxford University Press
for the World Bank.
Besley, T., 1997, 'Political Economy of Alleviating
Poverty: Theory and Institutions', World Bank
Research Observer, 12: 117-1.34.
Binswanger, H.P and S.R. Khandker, 1995, 'The
Impact of Formal Finance on the Rural Economy of
India', Journal of Development Studies, Vol. 32, No.2:
234-62.
Chowdhury, 1992, 'Credit in Rural Bangladesh', Asian
Economic Review: Journal of Indian Institute of
Economics, No. 2.
Christen, R., E. Rhyne, R, Vogel and C. McKean, 1995,
'Maximising the Outreach of Microenterprise
Finance: An Analysis of Successful Microfinance
Programs', USAID Program and Operations
Assessment Report 10, United States Agency for
International Development, Washington, D.C.
Christen, R., 1997, Banking Services for the Poor:
Managing for Financial Success, ACCION
International, Somerville, MA.
Copestake, JO., 1995, 'Poverty Oriented Financial
Service Provision: Room for Improvement', Savings
and Development, Vol. 19, No. 4.
Dawson, J., 1997, 'Beyond Credit - the Emergence of
High-impact, Cost-Effective Business Development
Services', Small Enterprise Development Journal, Vol.
8, No. 2: 15-25.
Gaiha, R., 1993, 'Design of Poverty Alleviation Strategy
in Rural Areas', FAO Economic and Social
Development Paper, 115, Food and Agricultural
Organization, Rome.
Goetz, AM. and R. Sengupta, 1996, 'Who takes the
Credit? Gender, Power, and Control Over Loan Use
in Rural Credit Programmes in Bangladesh', World
Development, Vol. 24, No. 1: 45-63.
Gonzalez-Vega, C. et al. 1997, 'BancoSol: the challenge
of growth for microfinance organisations', in H.
Schneider (cd.), Microfinance for the Poor?, OECD,
Paris.
Greeley M., 1994, 'Measurement of Poverty and
Poverty of Measurement', IDS Bulletin, Vol. 25, No.
2: 50-58.
Hashemi, SM., S.R. Schuler, and AP Riley, 1996,
'Rural Credit Programs and Women Empowerment
in Bangladesh', World Development, Vol. 24, No. 4:
635-54.
Hashemi, SM., 1997, 'Building up capacity for bank-
ing with the poor: the Grameen Bank in Bangladesh'
in H. Schneider (cd.), Microfinance for the Poor?,
OECD, Paris.
Hossain, M., 1988, 'Credit for Alleviation of Rural
Poverty: The Grameen Bank in Bangladesh',
Research Report 55, IFPRI, Washington, D.C.
Hulme, D. and P Mosley, (eds.), 1996, Finance Against
Poverty, Routledge, London.
Ito, S., 1998, 'The Grameen Bank and the Poor: A
Study of How Villagers Respond to a Group-based
Micro-Lending Programme', Unpublished D.Phil.
thesis, University of Sussex.
Jodha, N.S., 1988, 'Poverty Debate in India: A
Minority View', Economic and Political Weekly
(Special Issue): 2421-2428.
Kabeer, N., 1998, "Money Can't Buy Me Love'? Re-
evaluating Gender, Credit and Empowerment in
Rural Bangladesh', IDS Discussion Paper 363,
Institute of Development Studies, Brighton.
Lipton, M., 1998, Successes in Antipoverty, ILO,
Geneva.
Matin, 1., 1998, 'Rapid Credit Deepening and the Joint
Liability Credit Contract: A Study of Grameen Bank
Borrowers in Madhupur', Unpublished D.Phil. the-
sis, University of Sussex.
McKernan, S-M., 1996, 'The Impact of Micro-credit
Programs on Self-Employment Profits: Do Non-
credit Program Aspects Matter?', mimeo, Brown
University, Department of Economics.
Montgomery, R., D. Bhattacharya and D. Hulme,
1996, 'Credit for the poor in Bangladesh: the BRAG
rural development programme and the government
thana resource development and employment pro-
gramme' in D. Hulme and P Mosley (eds.), Finance
Against Poverty, Routledge, London.
9
Pitt, M. and S.R. Khandker, 1996, 'Household and
Intrahousehold Impacts of the Grameen Bank and
Similar Targeted Credit Programs in Bangladesh',
World Bank Discussion Paper 320, Washington, D.C.
RBI, 1954, All-India Rural Credit Survey, Reserve Bank
of India, Bombay
Rahman, A., 1992, 'The Informal Financial Sector in
Bangladesh: An Appraisal of its Role in
Development', Development and Change, Vol. 23, No.
1.
Rashid, M. and R. Townsend, 1994,' Targeting Credit
and Insurance: Efficiency, Mechanism Design and
Program Evaluation', Education and Social Policy
Department Discussion Paper 47, World Bank,
Washington, D.C.
Ravallion, M. and B. Sen, 1994, 'Impacts on Rural
Poverty of Landbased Targeting: Further Results for
Bangladesh', World Development, Vol. 22, No. 6:
823-38
RESULTS, 1997, 'The Micro-credit Summit February
2-4, 1997: Declaration and Plan of Action',
RESULTS, Washington D.C.
Schuler, SR., S.M. Hashemi and A.P Riley, 1997, 'The
Influence of Womens Changing Roles and Status in
BangladesWs Fertility Transition: Evidence from a
Study of Credit Programs and Contraceptive Use',
World Development, Vol, 25, No. 4: 563-76,
Sebstad, J. and G. Chen, 1996, 'Overview of Studies
on the Impact of Microenterprise Credit', mimeo,
Management System International, Washington,
D.C.
Stiglitz, JE. and A. Weiss, 1981, 'Credit Rationing in
Markets with Imperfect Information', American
Economic Review, Vol. 71, No. 3: 393-410.
UN, 1998, 'Role of micro-credit in the eradication of
poverty', Report of the Secretary General to the
General Assembly (A!53/223), United Nations, New
York.
van de Walle, D., 1997, 'Comment on "Rural Finance
in Africa: Institutional Developments and Access for
the Poor," by Ernest Aryeetey', in M. Bruno and B.
Pleskovic (eds.), Annual World Bank Conference on
Development Economics 1996, World Bank,
Washington, D.C.
von Pischke, J.D., H. Schneider and R. Zander, 1997,
'Introductory overview: principles and perspec-
tives', in H. Schneider (cd.), Microfinance for the
Poor?, OECD, Paris.
von Pischke, J.D., J.Yaron and R. Zander, 1998, 'Why
Credit Project Repayment Performance Declines',
Savings and Development (forthcoming).
Wiig, A., 1997, 'Micro-credit Programmes: Methods
for Solving Dilemmas for Credit Expansion',
Working Paper WP 1997: 12, Chr. Michelsen
Institute, Bergen.
Yaron, J., M.P Benjamin Jr., G. Piprek, 1997, Rural
Finance: Issues, Design and Best Practices,
Environmentally and Socially Sustainable
Development Studies and Monograph Series 14,
World Bank, Washington, D.C.
Zeller, M. et aI. 1997, 'Rural Finance for Food Security
for the Poor: Implications for Research and Policy',
Food Policy Review No. 4, IFPRI, Washington, D.C.
lo
